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Abstract 
 
The recent financial crisis has reawakened the U.S to the possible effects of a rapid economic 
downturn. Poor economic conditions have forced both households and government to tighten 
their budgets. Still, unemployment persists and the growth rate of the U.S has not been as robust 
as past recoveries. Worksharing, or short-time compensation (STC), is an unemployment 
insurance program where a pool of workers shares a reduction in their hours to avoid layoffs. 
The program offers both benefits and possible issues for firms, employees and state governments 
alike. This paper attempts to determine why certain states have elected to adopt STC where 
others have passed on it. Besides the obvious cause of higher unemployment, geography and 
political institutions prove to have substantial impacts on the chances of a state enacting 
legislation for STC. This model is followed by an analysis of STC’s small but positive impact on 
unemployment rates in the state of Connecticut.  
I. Introduction 
The 2008-2009 Financial Crisis has resulted in the largest economic downturn since the Great 
Depression. This “Great Recession” came at a time when citizens and many economists had 
settled into a sense of security from severe economic hardship (The Economist 2009). Since 
1933, America’s recessions had become more sporadic and shorter in duration (CNBC 2007). 
However, the crash of the housing market and the sequential collapse of the financial industry 
brought about widespread economic instability. Among other deteriorating economic conditions, 
unemployment rose from 5.0% at the beginning of 2008 to 9.9% at the end of 2009, the highest 
since 1983 (U.S Bureau of Labor Statistics). The recovery from this downfall has also been 
relatively slow and lackluster. GDP growth has averaged a tepid 2.4% since the end of the 
recession. Similarly, unemployment only declined to 8.2% in the first quarter of 2012 (Bureau of 
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Economic Analysis). Although our economy has shown to be relatively more stable in the recent 
decades, the experience from the past few years indicates that we still have room to improve our 
recovery policies. With respect to unemployment levels, some policymakers and think-tanks are 
considering some form of workshare to help avoid mass layoffs in downturns. As an indication 
of this focus on workshare, the federal government’s Job Creation Act of 2012 included funding 
for states’ STC programs. In the scope of American policymaking, the workshare program is 
often referred to as short-time compensation.      
Short-time compensation (STC) is a form of unemployment insurance whereby firms 
spread the reduction of hours across a larger pool of workers in lieu of laying off a select number 
of employees. For example, instead of laying off one employee, a firm reduces the hours of five 
employees by 20% each, thus equaling one lost employee. The goal of the program is to provide 
companies with the ability to temporarily reduce their production levels during an economic 
downturn (for the firm/industry or economy as a whole). By retaining more employees, firms can 
then return to pre-downturn production levels quicker and more efficiently. Businesses enrolled 
in the program can avoid recruiting and training costs. Additionally, workers in danger of losing 
their jobs avoid the typical economic and social hardships associated with losing a job (Shelton 
2011, p. 10). It is also thought that STC will reduce the social costs and burdens of unemployed 
workers on the government. STC is a common component in 25 of 33 OECD countries’ 
unemployment insurance systems. Despite STC’s popularity in Europe and its possible benefits, 
only 20 states in the U.S have enacted legislation to institute workshare.  
The lingering effects of the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis remind us how unemployment 
can cause persistent economic and social woes for individuals and society as a whole. Consumer 
confidence in the United States has suffered significantly since the onset of the Great Recession 
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(The Conference Board 2012). While the unemployment rate has steadily decreased since 2008, 
the real unemployment rate is speculated to be much higher. Additionally, as of January 2012, 
42.9% of those unemployed had been unemployed for 27 weeks or over (U.S Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 2012). Our federalist system provides the ability for individual states to create and test 
unique public policies. This enables other states to see the relative levels of success (or failure) 
of these policies so that they can adopt similar strategies. Short-time compensation as a form of 
unemployment insurance certainly promises advantages to reduce unemployment and allow for 
firms to adjust to downturns easily. In many of those states that do not have a form of short-time 
compensation, legislators have proposed introducing STC in the first session of 2012 
(Timesizing).  
This paper aims to determine the factors that cause states to adopt or not adopt STC. 
Various studies attempted to determine STC’s effects on unemployment, economic growth and 
state unemployment funds in the U.S as well as in other OECD countries. However, there has 
been very little research in understanding why states turn to STC. Many presume that states’ high 
unemployment rates are the primary cause for states adopting STC (Best 1981, p. 1). 
Unemployment will certainly play a large part of this decision but what factors induce some 
states to pursue it while others have held off? Mathematic Policy Research Institute and Berkeley 
Planning Associates’ (1997) survey study suggested that lobbying efforts of particular groups 
prevented or encouraged STC. Specifically, they found that legislators and organizations familiar 
with STC pushed for its adoption whereas others voiced concerns about its impact on businesses 
and the state funds. This was an interesting finding but it lacks any general systematic 
characteristics that might have played a role in these processes. 
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This paper will examine some of the institutional causes (or obstacles) for STC in states. 
By studying this question, we can understand the impediments to workshare legislation in the 
United States. This will explain at least partially, why the U.S lags behind countries like 
Germany which sport prominent workshare programs. Also, the results of this paper can help us 
predict STC’s future in the U.S. The empirical work in this paper tests how various indicators of 
economic conditions, legislature demographics and major characteristics of the state economy 
affect the chances of a state adopting STC. I used a binary logit model to determine the odds that 
the outcome of an STC program is due to one of the predictors. This paper will also include a 
rudimentary analysis of STC’s effect on the unemployment rate in the state of Connecticut. For 
this work, I used a multiple linear regression model to determine whether or not initial claims of 
STC have significantly affected the unemployment rate in Connecticut. I was not able to apply 
this analysis to every state because I was not able to acquire the number of enrolled firms and 
workers in each state’s program. Finally, I will remark on what the future holds for researching 
STC and its nuances. Collectively, this article will provide insight into the adoption of STC, its 
effects on unemployment in Connecticut and the promotion of STC within states that do offer it.  
The second section of this paper will provide some background information of 
worksharing in the United States. This is useful to see how the program has developed in the U.S 
and perhaps why it has been a slow transition. The third section offers a general overview of 
workshare and short-time compensation programs. This provides insight into some of the 
benefits and problems of workshare as well as highlights some of the possible differences 
between state programs. It will also entail a brief introduction to some of the literature and 
research on the subject of workshare and short-time compensation. In the fourth section, I will 
describe the methodology I used for my empirical research on short-time compensation. This 
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will entail both a brief analysis of the factors affecting adoption of STC and an analysis of STC’s 
relative effectiveness at alleviating unemployment rates in Connecticut. The fifth section will 
present the results of these regression sets. The sixth section will provide an analysis of this data 
and an interpretation of the results. I will then go over my conclusions of the data and make 
predictions on workshare’s future in the United States in the seventh and final section of the 
paper.  
II. History and Trends of Work share in the U.S 
Beginning in the U.S 
Worksharing as a method to reduce production dates back to the Great Depression when U.S 
firms sought to avoid widespread unemployment and poverty. At the time, unemployment 
insurance was not supplied by the government (Walsh et al 1997, p. 3-2). California enacted the 
first legislation incorporating STC in 1978. After the passage of Proposition 13, which limited 
property tax assessments, California state employees faced massive layoffs. In response to this 
concern, legislators instituted STC to reduce the work while avoiding a significant increase in 
unemployment (Torrence and Rejda 1987, p. 9). A few other states (3: Arizona, Washington and 
Oregon) enacted STC programs of their own in the years soon after 1978. The federal 
government recognized the trend and instituted federal laws and guidelines for these programs as 
other states (8) continued to adopt STC in the early 1980’s. However, the latter half of the 1980’s 
marked a period in which the federal government rescinded its oversight of STC. Seven states 
initiated work share programs during this time period. In the early 1990’s, Congress reinstituted 
laws for STC as just two more states began their own programs (Connecticut, Rhode Island). In 
2010, 18 states (see Table 1-1) had legislation for STC programs (U.S Department of Labor 
2012). Yet, in the wake of the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis, three more states have introduced new 
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legislation for STC in 2011. Many more states are expected to pass similar bills in 2012 
(Timesizing 2012). 
III. Overview of Short-Time Compensation 
Generic program details 
For the majority of states’ short-time compensation programs, unemployment insurance 
agencies require details of the four main facets of the plan for workshare from those firms that 
are interested in participating. First, firms must estimate the percent of work reduction necessary 
for them to continue operations. Often, states will only accept those firms with a minimum 
(typically 5, 10 or 20%) and/or a maximum reduction of their workforce (40-60%). Second, 
firms are required to report the workers involved and a plan for how their hours will be effected. 
Third, the firm must come up with a preliminary estimate of the duration of the program. Finally, 
firms are to indicate whether or not they will reduce (or eliminate altogether) fringe benefits to 
the work share employees (Vroman and Brusentsev 2009, p. 2-3). Some states require firms to 
continue extending full fringe benefits to the employees.   
Studies and research on STC 
 Scholars have analyzed STC for its merits and its weaknesses but there is no consensus 
on its effectiveness. Torrence and Rejda (1987) discussed the “New Employee Benefit” of STC 
and how the program might affect businesses, employees and the government respectively. 
Besides providing an overview of the program, they also offered a thorough literature review to 
describe real experiences of STC businesses, employees and state agencies. Businesses incurred 
higher relative costs in fringe benefits (provide same health care benefits while reducing 
production) and unemployment insurance payments but they also enjoyed lower training costs, 
improved labor productivity and improved labor relations (p. 13). As far as STC’s ability to 
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alleviate unemployment, Torrence and Rejda concluded that STC’s effect will be limited unless 
participation rates are significantly higher (p. 15).  
The Mathematic Policy Research Institute and Berkeley Planning Associates (1997) 
conducted one of the more cited empirical projects to examine how STC affected unemployment 
and state unemployment insurance trust funds. The paper found that state trust funds remained 
solvent (p. iii). Yet, the enactment of STC did not prove to substantially affect unemployment 
rates because participation rates were still relatively small. Surveying the businesses enrolled 
however, MPR and BPA concluded that firms expressed “general satisfaction” with the program 
and “often used the program repeatedly” (p. iii). The study also looked into the causes for states 
adopting STC but this scope largely focused on surveys and therefore produced individual 
reasons. Also, Cahuc and Carcillo (2010) examined STC in OECD countries. Their paper 
concluded that STC is useful in maintaining employment levels during recessionary periods. 
Burdett and Wright (2001) studied the labor market implications of short-time compensation, 
comparing the European model (prominent use of work share) to the U.S unemployment 
insurance program (primarily encouraged layoffs). From their model, Burdett and Wright 
suggested that workshare programs only expanded inefficient retention of employees, leading to 
substantial underemployment. 
Other papers have focused more on the construction and implementation of worksharing 
programs. Wayne Vroman of the Urban Institute and Vera Brustentsev (2009) of the University 
of Delaware studied short-time compensation and proposed those program extensions that 
offered the greatest likelihood of success for states. Cahuc and Carcillo (2010) also made 
suggestions for states to reduce inefficient use of work share programs. Van Audenrode’s 
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research on the cases of OECD countries’ experience with work share focused on the generosity 
of the program and the states’ ability to respond to economic conditions quickly.   
IV. Methodology 
 
Data 
This paper compiled the majority of its data from a variety of original sources including 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA – U.S Department of Commerce 2012), U.S Department 
of Labor (U.S DOL), Connecticut Department of Labor (CT DOL) and U.S’ Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS). I acquired certain data from third party sources such as Hirsch and 
Macpherson’s (2012) UnionStats database as well as Balducchi and Wandner’s (2011) study on 
STC. The BEA supplied information on gross state product (GSP), employment and industry-
specific production levels. The U.S DOL provided information on the adoption of STC by states. 
Additionally, the DOL’s information on other state unemployment insurance programs served as 
a basis for this paper’s principle component analysis for state innovation. Connecticut’s DOL 
provided data on its workshare claims from its adoption in 1992. The BLS offered data on state 
unemployment rates and industry employment levels.  
Dependent Variables 
For the main portion of this paper, I analyzed the factors affecting the chances of states 
adopting STC. This data came from the U.S DOL which provided the years for enactment of 
STC for any state. This dependent variable was a dummy variable (stc). I assigned a “0” to any 
state that never instituted any form of STC. Once a state adopted STC in any particular year, I 
inputted a “1” for that year but assigned no value for STC after that year. That is, once a state 
adopted STC, the variable becomes “dead”.  The purpose of this method is to ensure that the 
study tests for the factors leading up to adoption. For instance, an explanatory variable such as 
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high unemployment might cause a state to adopt STC. If unemployment were to then go down 
but a “1” for STC would skew the data to suggest that unemployment did not have an impact on 
STC. This dummy variable for STC does overlook a few nuances. A dummy variable for STC 
ignores any possible qualifier for a state’s commitment to the program. While a state may enact 
legislation to include STC in its functioning by law, the state may decline to commit resources to 
really initiate the program. Also, the nature of the legislative process often delays a public policy 
from being enacted immediately after an event or situation. Although one of the model’s 
variables might cause a state to consider enacting STC, it may take a year or two for the 
respective state legislature to turn out legislation for the program.  
The second extension of this paper seeks to perform an analysis of the effects on the 
unemployment rate (ctun) of Connecticut for the same time period of 1978-2011. STC programs 
can affect a number of economic indicators. As mentioned earlier, STC potentially protects 
levels of consumption, GDP growth and labor production levels. However, I chose to test STC’s 
significance to Connecticut’s unemployment rate because it is the central focus of the program. 
Furthermore, a state’s unemployment rate is intimately involved with these other economic 
indicators. Once again however, a newly instituted STC program will not necessarily have an 
immediate impact on unemployment rates. State agencies, firms and employees will take time to 
learn about the program and use it effectively. 
Independent variables 
 For the binary logit model that tested the factors affecting STC adoption I controlled for 
the region of the states. These regions were broken down into the Midwest (mw), Northeast (ne), 
Southwest (sw) and West (west). This meant that the intercept accounted for states in the 
Southeast. I included these regional variables to account for geographical patterns that defined 
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these areas. States within a region share economic, political and social characteristics that may 
not be accounted for in other variables of the model. These regions, of course, are not perfect 
separations and are partially arbitrary. Similar to this variable for the region, I tested the 
significance of a dummy variable for a neighboring state having adopted STC (dumnei). State 
legislatures may mimic neighboring states’ policies for a number of reasons. The geographical 
proximity makes it more likely that legislators from neighboring states maintain some sort of 
correspondence, presenting the possibility of information spillover. Also, neighboring states are 
in competition for acquiring (or retaining) residents so a legislature might adopt STC if it has a 
positive reputation. This model also controlled for the year variable (yr) to determine if there was 
a general growth pattern of STC in the U.S.  
 Economic conditions and aspects surely play a role in the chances that a state will adopt 
STC. Equation 1 tested for how states’ unemployment rates (un) might affect the chances of 
adopting STC. I acquired the data from the U.S’ Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) which 
measured the rates as the percentage of persons in the workforce without a job. This variable 
tests the common explanation for the unemployment causing STC adoption. I also introduced a 
variable for labor productiveness, average production of labor (avpro). Using BEA data on gross 
state production (GSP) and the total number of private employees, I calculated for the average 
production of labor by dividing GSP by the number of employees. Advocates of STC suggest 
that the program allows firms to retain skilled employees in a time of economic uncertainty. The 
average production of labor can therefore test if a higher-skilled workforce might induce states to 
enact STC. This measure of labor’s average production lacked data on the actual number of 
hours worked. Rather, it depended on just the number of employees. Also, this variable for 
human capital might be distorted by states’ varying bounty of technology and capital. These 
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inputs might artificially increase the average production of labor without actual higher human 
capital. Another important economic factor to consider is the breakdown of a state’s economy. 
For this particular model, I tested for the number of construction employees (const, in thousands 
of jobs) in a state. The construction industry’s nature makes it an ideal candidate for using STC. 
Shelton (2011) researched the firms enrolling in STC and found that “specialty trades 
contractors” in construction often used STC because apprentices learned numerous skills on the 
job (p. 6). Also, the construction industry is highly sensitive to economic fluctuations so STC 
could help keep it afloat during downturns. As a result, one would expect legislators might be 
more likely to enact STC if a substantial construction industry is undergoing mass layoffs.   
Besides economic interpretations, this paper attempts to determine if certain political 
aspects could encourage legislatures to adopt STC. This model controlled for the unionization 
(perunion) of a state. Hirsch and Macpherson (2012) compiled data from the U.S Census’ CPA 
to determine the percentage of employees in a state that belong to unions. Krueger and Burton 
(1989) found that higher union rates partially caused higher levels of workers’ compensation 
claims. Consequently, they suggested that union members may be “better informed of their 
rights” and ready to use them. The variable for unionization could then possibly explain a larger 
lobbying effort by unions to pursue STC legislation. To control for the political ideology of a 
state legislature, I tested the relationship that a Democrat-dominated legislature (demdom) might 
have on the chances of a state adopting STC. This dummy variable assigned a value of “1” to 
those respective states and years where Democrats held a majority in both the House and Senate 
chambers of the state legislature. Ultimately, state legislators determine which laws are passed 
and controlling both chambers makes it far easier for one party to pass its own bills. Democrats 
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typically favor more government intervention in economic and income inequality matters. I 
expect this variable to have a positive correlation with the chances of states adopting STC.  
Beyond this ideological factor, this paper attempts to account for a state legislature’s 
level of public policy innovation with respect to unemployment insurance programs. To create an 
index of state innovation, I incorporated a number of special programs and extensions relating to 
unemployment insurance in a principal component analysis (PCA). These programs ranged from 
offering self employment assistance to funding extended training for people on unemployment 
insurance. The U.S Department of Labor listed these options in their breakdown of state 
unemployment insurance laws. However, the DOL has constantly altered what they included in 
this list so the PCA only accounted for one year to simplify the analysis. This clearly overlooks 
how a state’s level of innovation may evolve from year to year. Still, it is not that difficult to 
imagine that some states have always pursued creative government policies (California, 
Washington, etc.) while others consistently avoid government solutions (Montana, North Dakota, 
etc.) I chose to collect the special programs of the most recent year, 2011. This index for state 
innovation can incorporate a number of aspects of a state such as its general political ideology or 
the extent to which its legislators are informed of alternatives in unemployment insurance 
policies. Finally, I included a dummy variable for those years that the federal government 
instituted its own policy guidelines for STC (fedpol). Federal policies can both discourage and 
encourage states to adopt a particular program such as STC. This variable differed from the 
alternative of the federal government just having STC in law. I suggest that instituting guidelines 
presents a more direct connection to state legislation because it entails some sort of oversight.    
 Equation 2 offers a multiple linear regression model to determine how STC has affected 
the unemployment rate in the state of Connecticut from 1978 to 2011. Connecticut only enacted 
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STC in 1992 where filing for it began in October. The first control variable is that of the year 
(yr). As before, this variable simply presents any general pattern of Connecticut’s unemployment 
rate. This model also controls for the national unemployment rate (natun) as a general indicator 
of the national economic environment. This speaks to firms and consumers’ confidence levels as 
they perceive economic crisis on the national scale even if it may initially be focused in different 
region(s) of the country. This variable entails some level of endogeneity as Connecticut’s 
unemployment rate factors into the national unemployment rate.  
 This model also attempts to account for some of the possible economic causes of 
unemployment. First, taxes on production simply add to the costs of production and can therefore 
lead to firms reducing their workforces (tax). This variable came from DOC’s BEA (2012) 
which defined the indicator as the total number of taxes levied on production and imports less 
subsidies. To account for the overall economic conditions of Connecticut’s economy, I included 
a variable for gross state production (gsp). The BEA measured this as the value of all the goods 
and services produced in the state. Employment levels also depend on the wealth of human 
capital in the state. Once again, I used the average production of labor (ctavpro) to reflect this 
quality aspect of labor. The model also incorporated the ratio of goods-production employees to 
services-production employees (gsrat) to generate a conception of industry mix. Polzin (2001) 
implied that industry mix is one of the factors affecting growth and unemployment levels. This 
produces an issue of multicollinearity as this variable might affect the variable for GSP.  
 The primary explanatory variables I focused on are the number of seasonally-adjusted 
initial claims for both normal unemployment insurance and STC. I acquired the data for 
seasonally-adjusted initial claims of generic unemployment insurance (ini_sa) on the DOL’s 
website (2012). Data on the number of initial claims made was only available for the years of 
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1986-2011. An inquiry into the Connecticut Department of Labor resulted in the compilation of 
data for the number of seasonally-adjusted workshare initial claims (wic_sa). This variable will 
produce an overestimated effect of STC’s effect because it did not offer equivalent numbers for 
normal unemployment insurance. That is, a firm enrolled in STC may file four claims to reduce 
the hours of each employee by 25% to equal one complete layoff. In the normal unemployment 
insurance program however, this firm would have just made one claim for the individual laid off. 
To reduce the effect of this inherent data error, I tested the logs of each claims variable. This 
way, the model tests for the impact of the change in each of these variables rather than their 
actual values.  
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Equation 1: Factors Affecting Chances of Adopting STC (n=1700, included 
observations=1268) 
Variable Explanation of variable Summary Statistics Data Source 
MW Dummy variable indicating state is 
in the Midwest region 
Sum=408 (12 states * 34 
years) 
 
NE Dummy variable indicating state is 
in the Northeast region 
Sum=374 (11 states * 34 
years) 
 
SW Dummy variable indicating state is 
in the Southwest region 
Sum=136 (4 states * 34 
years) 
 
West Dummy variable indicating state is 
in the West region 
Sum=374 (11 states * 34 
years) 
 
YR Variable for the year Min=1978, Max=2011, 
Median=1994.5 
 
Un The average state unemployment 
rate for each respective year (% of 
people in the workforce without 
work) 
Min=2.2, Max=17.4, 
Mean=5.99, Median=5.6 
U.S’ Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) 
Avpro Average production of labor, 
calculated as gross state product 
(GSP, in millions of $) divided by 
the total number of private 
employees (thousands of 
employees) 
Min=19.58, 
Max=151.21, 
Mean=59.15, 
Median=55.73 
Calculated using GSP 
and employment figures 
from U.S’ Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
(BEA)  
Perunion The percentage of employees in the 
state that are unionized (%) 
Min=2.3, Max=32.5, 
Mean=13.99, 
Median=13.2 
Hirsch and Macpherson 
(2012), UnionStates.com 
(compiled from U.S’ 
Census’ Current 
Population Survey) 
Demdom Dummy variable indicating a state 
legislature where both chambers 
are controlled by a majority of 
Democrats 
Sum=820 U.S Census’ Statistical 
Abstract 
PCAinn Index rating states’ public policy 
with respect to special 
unemployment insurance programs 
constructed by a principal 
component analysis (Normalized 
scale where 0 is average, above 0 is 
more creative state, and below zero 
is less creative) 
Min= -2.78, Max=2.76, 
Mean= -2.00E-11, 
Median=0.19 
Principal Component 
Analysis (Policy 
information from U.S 
Department of Labor 
(DOL)) 
Fedpol Dummy variable indicating that the 
federal government instituted 
federal policy guidelines for the 
respective years 
Sum=200 (4 years * 50 
states) 
Balducchi and Wandner 
(Compiled from U.S 
DOL) 
Dumnei Dummy variable indicating that a 
neighbor state has enacted STC 
Sum=1054  
Const Variable for the number of 
construction employees in a state (# 
employees) 
Min=12,786; 
Max=1,289,555 
Mean=161820.2 
Median= 
U.S DOC’s BEA 
 
 
Kimball 17 
 
 
Equation 2: STC’s Effect on Connecticut’s Unemployment Rate (1978-2011, n=34) 
Variable Explanation of variable Summary Statistics Data Source 
YR Variable for the year Min=1978, Max=2011, 
Mean=1994.5, 
Median=1994.5 
 
Tax Taxes levied on production and 
imports less subsidies (millions of 
current $) 
Min=2,820; 
Max=15,609; 
Mean=9,074.15; 
Median=8,689 
U.S DOC’s BEA 
NatUN The national unemployment rate, 
calculated as the number of 
unemployed persons in the 
workforce (%) 
Min=3.97, Max=9.71, 
Mean=6.36, 
Median=5.92 
U.S BLS 
GSP Gross state production Min=33,231; 
Max=246,500; 
Mean=129,013.6; 
Median=118,163.5 
U.S DOC’s BEA 
CTavpro Average production of labor, 
calculated as gross state product 
(GSP, in millions of $) divided by 
the total number of private 
employees (thousands of 
employees) 
Min=23.84, 
Max=127.86, 
Mean=71.85, 
Median=70.42 
Calculated using GSP 
and employment figures 
from U.S’ Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 
(BEA) 
GSrat The ratio of goods-producing 
employees to services-producing 
employees 
Min=0.15, Max=0.37, 
Mean=0.25, 
Median=0.24 
U.S BLS 
WIC_SA The number of seasonally adjusted 
workshare initial claims filed 
n=20, Min=54.36, 
Max=1795.38, 
Mean=297.72, 
Median=174.88 
Connecticut Department 
of Labor 
INI_SA The number of seasonally-adjusted 
normal unemployment insurance 
initial claims 
n=26, Min=3217.65, 
Max=6737.86, 
Mean=4719.52, 
Median=4816.48 
U.S DOL 
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V. Results 
Equation 1 
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Equation 2 
 
VI. Analysis 
Equation 1 
 The results for equation 1 only got a McFadden R-squared of 0.2232 so the explanatory 
variables of the model only accounted for approximately 22% of the variance of the dependent 
variable. The coefficients of this equation represented the effect of the variable on the logged 
odds of a state adopting STC. To calculate the percentage effect on these changes, I inputted the 
coefficient into the exponential function [e.g. e^(β)]. Predictably, regions like the Northeast and 
Midwest had higher coefficients (3.13 and 2.62 respectively) while the Southeast was lower than 
any region. Of the Southeastern states, only Arkansas, Louisiana and Florida have enacted 
legislation for STC. The dummy variable for a neighboring state having adopted STC (dumnei) 
Kimball 20 
 
 
had a substantial and significant effect on the odds of another state enacting STC. The 
coefficient, 3.02 (p=0.0001), results in an approximate 1939% increase in the chance of a state 
adopting STC. Surely, this effect is exaggerated but it does speak to how neighboring states 
interact. If a neighbor state adopts STC, it is likely that neighboring state legislatures will 
strongly consider enacting STC in the years soon afterward. The variable for the year had a 
positive but statistically insignificant effect on the logged odds of adopting STC (0.05, 
p=0.6231). A number of states enacted STC legislation throughout the 1980’s and a few adopted 
the program in the early 1990’s. There was a gap until the onset of the recent financial crisis 
when three states adopted STC in 2011.  
 State unemployment rates did have fairly strong effect (coef=0.2307, s.e. 0.1333) on the 
dependent variable but the p-value was a little high at 0.0834. The coefficient on unemployment 
implies that a one-point increase in the state’s unemployment rate would increase the chances of 
the state adopting STC by 26%. This was the predicted effect of unemployment but the variable 
is not strongly significant. The significance of unemployment might be hurt by the lag time 
between unemployment rising and states actually adopting STC. The component for human 
capital, average production of labor, had the opposite of the predicted effect on the dependent 
variable. An additional $1,000 in production per employee decreased the chances of a state 
enacting STC by approximately 5.29%. The p-value was high (p=0.2223) for this variable 
however so it is not significant. The number of construction employees in a state had a small but 
statistically effect of coef=0.0058. This meant that an additional 1,000 employees in a state’s 
construction industry result in 0.58% increase in the chances of adopting STC. Although this 
impact is small, an aggregation of similar industries like manufacturing could cause a more 
substantial difference. Unionization seems to have a statistically insignificant impact but it did 
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have a negative coefficient which is interesting by itself. This relationship might be explained by 
union leaders’ desire to retain their own income levels. Shelton (2011) explained that higher-
income workers had to give more hours to make up for their higher wages (p. 3).  
 A Democrat-dominated legislature substantially increases the logged odds of the state 
pursuing STC (coef=1.5926). This translated into an approximate 392% increase in these odds. 
Once again, this result seems to be overemphasized but it does seem that Democrats are more 
willing to explore new government policies to intervene in the state economy. This paper’s PCA 
for state innovation did not produce a statistically significant result (p=0.2045) but it did have a 
positive sign associated with the odds of STC. This result is pretty straight forward in assuming 
that a more innovative state legislature will be more willing to enact legislation for the relatively 
young program of STC. Finally, the years in which the federal government instituted guidelines 
for state STC programs had a high, positive correlation with adoption of STC. Fedpol increased 
chances of adoption by approximately 410%. Although the p-value was low for this variable 
(p=0.0142), the minimal number of years where federal policy was instituted (1982-1986) castes 
significant doubt on this finding. Also, the relationship could simply be inversed. That is, a 
number of states adopting STC in those years caused the federal government to respond with 
guidelines of its own.  
Equation 2 
 Equation 2 is the result of a multiple linear regressions model testing for the factors 
affecting Connecticut’s unemployment rate from 1978-2011. The adjusted R-squared for 
equation 2 was very high at 0.9541 implying that the independent variables accounted for about 
95% of the changes in Connecticut’s unemployment rate. The year variable (yr) again had a 
statistically insignificant result (p=0.5788) but it had a negative sign on the coefficient. This 
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meant that Connecticut’s unemployment rate has generally declined since 1978. This does make 
sense considering our economy has become relatively more stable (minus the recent financial 
crisis). The national unemployment rate (natun) had the predicted positive effect on 
Connecticut’s unemployment rate. An increase in the national unemployment rate by 1 point 
increased Connecticut’s unemployment rate by 0.86. This indicates that Connecticut is less 
affected by a national economic downturn than other states. There is a conflict of endogeneity 
here as Connecticut’s unemployment is factored into the national rate.  
 It was interesting to find that taxes levied on production and imports (tax) actually 
seemed to reduce the unemployment rate although the p-value was high (0.5149). This 
conclusion could be attributed to the fact that the state will reap more taxes from private 
production in times of good economic conditions when unemployment is down. The change in 
GSP [log(gsp)] had a similar result where it reduced unemployment but the finding was not 
significant (p=0.7116). The change in the ratio of goods-producing employees to services-
producing employees provided another interesting conclusion. Again, the change in this variable 
reduced unemployment and the p-value was relatively low (p=0.0514). A 1% increase in this 
ratio resulted in a decrease of the unemployment rate by 0.2. The max of this explanatory 
variable was 0.37 so in the selected time period, there have been more services-producing 
employees in the state. This variable was meant to express industry diversity so it would make 
sense that as gsrat approached a value of “1”, the increase in industry diversity would lead to a 
lower unemployment rate. The variable is not a perfect representation of industry mix. The 
average production of labor in Connecticut (ctavpro) was also included to get some sense of 
human capital. It did not have a significant result and its sign was positive so this indicator was 
not very relevant. As mentioned earlier, average production of labor is not the ideal 
Kimball 23 
 
 
representation of human capital because of mitigating inputs of technology and capital. 
Education attainment levels were not readily accessible for each year but that could better serve 
the use as human capital. 
 The changes in the initial claims of normal unemployment insurance programs and STC 
presented the predicted results. A 1% increase in the seasonally-adjusted workshare initial claim 
reduced Connecticut’s unemployment rate by approximately 0.01. Although this value is small, 
the coefficient has the predicted sign and the p-value indicates that the variable is significant. 
Future studies ought to calculate the effect of normal unemployment insurance-equivalent STC 
claims on unemployment rates. In contrast, a 1% in the number of initial claims filed for normal 
unemployment insurance increased unemployment by 0.03 but this result was less significant 
(p=0.1870). This showed that STC seemed to reduce unemployment compared to its alternative 
of unemployment insurance.  
VII. Conclusion  
Findings 
The “Great Recession” has policymakers scrambling for answers to alleviate high 
unemployment rates, stir stagnant GDP growth and restore confidence in our economy. 
Workshare or STC makes for an attractive remedy. Rather than encouraging employers to lay off 
workers to reduce costs, STC subsidizes firms to reduce hours of multiple individuals (Shelton 
2011, p. 2). This program allows businesses to easily adjust to downswing and upswings of the 
economy. Employees retain their jobs and can make appropriate plans for their future careers if 
necessary. The government avoids the burden of a larger unemployed workforce. Yet, only 20 
states have adopted some form of STC as of 2011. This paper aimed to generate systematic 
explanations for why more states haven’t enacted STC. Furthermore, I performed a limited 
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analysis on the performance of STC in the state of Connecticut to pose the benefit of the 
program. 
The primary model of this paper did justify some of the typical economic explanations 
for the adoption of STC but it also showed how geography and political institutions affect public 
policies. Higher unemployment, as predicted, induced states to create legislation for STC. Also, a 
larger pool of construction employees had a small but positive effect on the chances of adopting 
STC. A more egalitarian Democrat legislature proved to substantially increase the chances 
enacting the program. Yet, many prominent advocates of worksharing today come from 
conservative think tanks such as Kevin Hassett of the American Enterprise Institute (Woo 2011). 
Even more important, states appeared to mimic neighboring states that adopted STC. Information 
spillover, or the exchange of knowledge and information, may cause legislators and policy actors 
to follow the example of neighboring states. Also, states are competitive in nature for business 
and residents so STC seems to be an attractive program for states.  
 MPR and BPA (1997) studied the factors leading to the adoption of STC from surveying 
policymakers, firms and state citizens. This paper’s findings complement MPR and BPA’s more 
individualized microanalysis. They found that it was often the work of a legislator or 
organization favoring STC that pushed for its adoption (p. ii). My findings suggest that 
prominent stakeholders in implementing a form of STC will find success in states with 
Democrat-dominated legislatures. Given the similarities of ideology between many neighboring 
states, reports of success for STC will quickly transfer to neighbor states. Stakeholders may be 
legislators or organizations but my model also showed how a particular industry (construction) 
could also encourage states to adopt STC.  
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 This paper’s second model tested for STC’s effectiveness at reducing unemployment in 
Connecticut between 1978 and 2011 (though STC was instituted in 1992). With other economic 
factors hold fixed, an increase in the number of workshare initial claims filed caused 
unemployment to fall. This effect was small but the data inherently suggests a couple of caveats 
to consider. As I showed in the first equation, higher state unemployment rates will encourage 
the adoption of STC. Therefore, a greater usage of STC will also be the result of higher 
unemployment. An important relationship to recognize is how workshare’s effect differs from 
typical unemployment insurance. In this model, unemployment insurance showed to have a 
positive effect on Connecticut’s unemployment rate. 
 Equation 2 is a very small sample of data and thus does not carry with it a lot of weight 
but it does fall in line with the other empirical work. Cahuc and Carcillo’s (2011) study of STC 
in OECD countries found that STW’s take-up rate helped permanent and temporary job-holders 
to retain their employment. However, the only consensus about STC’s effects is that it is difficult 
to determine. Low take-up rates by firms in a state prevent economists from truly determining if 
workshare affects the state’s unemployment rate (MPR & BPA 1997, p. ii). Furthermore, studies 
analyzing differences between firms opting for STC and those that just lay off workers are 
hampered by the varying economic circumstances that each firm faces (Schiff, p. 435).  
Areas for further research 
 A substantial amount of research is out there to be completed to determine the factors in 
adopting workshare and its relative effectiveness in the United States. The models presented in 
this paper lack some important variables and facets of the variables used. For example, the first 
model missed an indicator of some kind for a state legislature’s level of professionalism. A 
legislature that is more experienced and spends more time in the state chambers may allow them 
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to discuss and explore more options like STC. Adoption of STC can also be tested by a more 
detailed breakdown of a state’s economy. This paper’s first equation did include a variable for 
the prevalence of construction employees in the state but there are a number of other industries 
that could either increase or decrease the chances of adopting STC.  
 In those states that have adopted STC, research can test a more comprehensive study of 
STC’s effects. This paper’s second equation was limited to only the state of Connecticut due to a 
lack of data for other states. Even within the data for the state of Connecticut, workshare claims 
were not equalized with the comparable unemployment insurance claims. Another interesting 
route for this research could be to see how STC affects other economic indicators in a state such 
as GDP growth recovery, labor production levels and the state’s unemployment insurance trust 
funds. MPR and BPA’s (1997) work also suggested that the marketing of STC can differ greatly 
between states. STC’s effectiveness might be skewed if businesses are not properly informed of 
the program’s benefits (and cons). Furthermore, STC programs are made up from a number of 
different aspects (continuing fringe benefits) which differ between states. Future research ought 
to investigate how these various extensions of the program might affect the take-up rates by 
firms in a state.  
 Short-time compensation is not a cure-all for the effects of economic downturns but 
preliminary studies offer optimism for its potential. Innovative state agencies have shown the 
ability already to ameliorate issues of STC’s funding and administrative procedures by 
streamlining the process (MPR and BPA 1997, p. ii). To get to this point however, states need to 
adopt the program and install their own preferences for the program. The primary model of this 
paper indicates that this may be a lengthy process because STC adoption has largely depended 
on Democrat-dominated politics and a geographical proximity to other states with STC. With 
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respect to the region of the Southeast, STC will have to overcome ideological preferences and 
little participation in the program as of right now. STC has shown that it can help states adjust to 
economic downturns but economists, state agencies and policymakers will have to continue to 
work out its kinks so that it is more appealing to critics.  
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